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Legal education as a strategy for change in
the legal profession
MARY JANE MOSSMAN
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada

Introduction
But where, if not in school and workplace, is society built and changed?1
In The Real World of Technology, the renowned Canadian physicist Ursula Franklin
described the idea of technology as practice, a way of organising work and people. In
her view, technology is not ‘‘the sum of the artifacts, of the wheels and gears, of
the rails and electronic transmitters’’ but rather a system: ‘‘technology involves
organization, procedures, symbols, new words, equations, and, most of all, a
mindset’’. For Franklin, many recent developments in technology represent profound
and violent transformations in human society. Significantly, moreover, she suggested
that nothing short of a global reformation of major social forces can provide security
for the world and its citizens, a reformation which seems, according to her analysis,
to need the expertise and imagination of the legal profession:
Such a development will require the redefinition of rights and
responsibilities, and the setting of limits to power and control. There
have to be completely diﬀerent criteria for what is permissible and what is
not. Central to any new order that can shape and direct technology and
human destiny will be a renewed emphasis on the concept of justice.
The viability of technology, like democracy, depends in the end on the

practice of justice and on the enforcement of limits to power.2
In the context of our general reassessment of legal education and the legal
profession, Franklin’s emphasis on the practice of justice oﬀers an important
challenge. To what extent can legal education resist the demands of the market
which have so captured the ethos of legal practice, if not all of those who are legal
practitioners? To what extent do legal educators have tools and strategies, as well as
ideas, to challenge dominant ideologies of corporate (legal) agendas? Do law teachers
have a responsibility to join (or lead?) voices that resist defining the world in terms
of market pressures and the demands of globalisation?
Franklin’s ideas provide the context for some reflections in this paper about
gender equality in the legal profession. The paper is part of a larger project,
examining both historical and contemporary contexts for women lawyers, which
seeks to map the intersection between the entry of women to the legal profession
and related developments in social equality movements and in the ‘formation’ of
professional culture in law. It is also a work-in-progress about the relationships
between legal education and the culture of the legal profession. The paper begins
with a brief overview of recent literature about women in law, and then focuses on
the recommendations of the task force established by the Canadian Bar Association
to promote greater gender equality in the law and the legal profession in Canada in
1993.3 One recommendation suggested that law firms should engage in seminars
about issues of gender equality, and as a result, I was requested to design and
implement a series of seminars for three of the largest law firms in Toronto over a
period of 4 years in the late 1990s. In earlier writing,4 I have focused on the special
pedagogical challenges involved in such educational programming, and the need for
problem-solving approaches quite diﬀerent from traditional forms of continuing
education for lawyers.
In this paper, I examine some perspectives on lawyering which seem important
to an assessment of the role of education in fostering greater equality in the legal

profession. In this context, Ursula Franklin’s insights about the impact of technology
oﬀer ways of thinking about these challenges in terms of goals of building and
changing society; as her perceptive question asks: ‘‘where, if not in school and
workplace, is society built and changed?’’
Studies on women in law: problems and possibilities
Women have been becoming lawyers in Canada for more than a century,5 yet, until
relatively recently, women have represented only a tiny minority of lawyers and an
even smaller number within the judiciary.6 Statistics assembled by the CBA task
force indicated that the percentage of women members of the legal profession
increased dramatically in all parts of Canada after 1970. By 1993, the task force
report stated that women lawyers comprised 27% of the practising profession,
although only 12% of federally-appointed judges; the report also concluded that
women were generally under-represented in private practice and over-represented
among those employed in government.7 This general pattern of increasing numbers
of women members of the legal profession and the judiciary in Canada appears to
be similar to trends in other Western jurisdictions. As a result, there has been a
noticeable increase in scholarly attention to women’s entry to the legal profession,
both monitoring the rate of this changing demography and attempting to assess its
potential to change the profession’s traditional (male) culture. For example, in her
comparative essay about women lawyers in several diﬀerent countries around the
world, Carrie Menkel-Meadow confirmed the trend of increasing numbers of women
lawyers almost everywhere in the world. However, she also posed a question about
the meaning of increased numbers of women lawyers, suggesting that whether
women will be changed by the legal profession, or whether the legal profession will
be changed by the increased presence of women is a diﬀerent—and more important—
question.8
In the 1990s, legal scholars in a number of jurisdictions have examined the
experiences of women as lawyers and tried to assess their impact on law and the

legal profession. For example, Clare McGlynn’s 1998 study of women members of
the legal profession in the United Kingdom documented the barriers and
opportunities which continue to exist, as well as women’s perseverance and
optimism in personal stories of their experiences in academe, and as solicitors,
barristers and judges.9 McGlynn also argued that it is necessary to connect
the concerns and struggles of these individual women lawyers to broader,
institutional arrangements: ‘‘the economic structure of the firm and the legal
profession, the nature of the law and legal culture, [and . . .] the fact that women
as a whole are disadvantaged in society as well as in the legal academy and
profession’’.10
In another British study, Hilary Sommerlad and Peter Sanderson explored the
experiences of women solicitors and the institutional and cultural barriers to their
participation in the legal profession.11 Similarly, Mona Harrington’s 1993 study of
women lawyers in the United States provided an analysis of structural factors
constraining women lawyers’ roles, and examples from the lives of women lawyers
illustrating the complexity of their individual choices within these constraints.12
Harrington identified barriers in the nature of law, legal education, and the culture
of legal practice and law firms. She also suggested that media presentations of
women lawyers too often ignore real problems; as a result, for women lawyers who
perceive systemic double standards and discrimination, the problem is ‘‘to find a
way to speak about them when the norms say that good women lawyers, successful
women lawyers, see no such problems’’.13
Harrington’s conclusions in the USA are, on the whole, more optimistic than
Margaret Thornton’s study of women lawyers in Australia—where she characterised
women lawyers as ‘‘fringe-dwellers of the jurisprudential community’’.14 For
Thornton, the reality of legal work at the present time constitutes a formidable
barrier to changes which would eﬀect gender equality goals; as she concluded,
‘‘neither an increase in the number of women nor the passing of time can provide
an automatic remedy’’.15 In such a context, she suggested that women who ‘‘make

it in a man’s world’’ can do so only by assimilating the traditional (male)
characteristics of the profession. In terms of eﬀecting goals of gender
equality, ‘‘there is nothing potentially radical about such women because they
do not wish to change any aspect of legal practice as it is . . .’’;16 moreover,
according to Thornton, conformity on the part of some women lawyers to the
traditional culture of the profession confirms for many that gender is not an issue,
a conclusion which absolves the profession from taking any initiatives that might
further gender equality goals.
Although Thornton’s analysis is pessimistic, it is supported by the conclusions
of other scholars. For example, the 1995 study by Bernard Lentz and David Laband
in the USA provided an assessment of thousands of responses to the National Survey
of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction administered by the American Bar Association in
1984 and again in 1990.17 Using pay and promotion criteria, the authors concluded
that there was little overt discrimination against women lawyers in the United States,
a finding which they acknowledged to be diﬀerent from the conclusions of some
other studies. However, they also asserted that diﬀerences in rates of pay or
promotion would be ‘‘relatively easy to prove in a court of law’’, thus making these
forms of discrimination risky.18 Instead, Lentz and Laband argued that forms of
discriminatory behaviour against women lawyers were much more subtle and covert,
making them harder to identify and challenge:
Relative to comparable men lawyers, women lawyers report a sense of
powerlessness in the workplace, and they do not believe that their
performance is evaluated on the basis of merit. . . . [Female] lawyers
apparently

experience subtle discrimination on margins that are not

easily provable in a court of law. . . . Given that those women who are
most knowledgeable

about their rights suﬀer multidimensional

discrimination, the eﬀectiveness of existing civil rights law is called into
question.19

In her recent study of relatively new entrants to the legal profession in the
Canadian province of British Columbia, Joan Brockman also identified additional
pressures as well as special limitations on career advancement for women lawyers,
by contrast with their male colleagues.20 Although Brockman reported that men and
women were initially drawn to the legal profession for quite similar reasons, her
research revealed that they often experienced diﬀering, gendered opportunities as
members of the profession. Her interviewees provided data about diﬀerences in
terms of ‘fitting in’ the profession, their experiences of discrimination and sexual
harassment, and challenges of balancing work and family life. There was also some
evidence that women were more reluctant to embrace the adversarial nature of legal
work with as much ease as men who were lawyers. Her study is also important
because it specifically focused on newly-admitted lawyers; clearly if this group of
lawyers is continuing to experience gendered diﬀerences in the practice of law, then
it is not ‘just a matter of time’ before the situation will inevitably change for the
better. As Brockman reported:
Discrimination in the legal profession can come from a variety of sources.. . .
[Some] men will discriminate against women simply because they are women.
Although there was no measure of this in this study, the proportion of men who
fell into this category seems to be small. Most of them are identified as
belonging to the ‘old boys’club’, and are thought to be becoming relics of
the past. However, according to some respondents, ‘baby dinosaurs’ are
growing up to replace them. Some women in this study sacrificed their
personal lives and sold their souls to their law firms in order to become
partners. They were being let go with glowing recommendations, rather than
being invited into partnerships. The men who were poised for partnership, on
the other hand, saw little standing in their way. It is diﬃcult to conclude that
the legal profession has rid itself of discrimination.21

Brockman’s study is also important because it takes account of links between
gender equality in the legal profession and in the broader society, and because it
recognises how personal ‘choices’ on the part of women lawyers must be understood
within a social context.22 In this way, Brockman’s study focuses on systemic,
structural barriers which constrain opportunities for women lawyers more than for
men who are lawyers—and on the resulting need for structural changes to overcome
them. These conclusions in the Canadian context are similar to those of Sommerlad
and Sanderson in the United Kingdom;23 as they argued, a strategy which supports
women members of the legal profession must be ‘multi-pronged’, including measures
to foster childcare provision, initiatives to bring more women into public bodies,
and codes of practice (with procedures for monitoring and enforcing them) for
public employees and also for firms which contract with the State.24
All of these studies about women members of the legal profession recognised, at
least to some extent, the broader context of changes within the profession, some of
which continue to exacerbate women’s opportunities as lawyers. Yet, to some extent,
the emerging literature about critical changes in the nature and processes of legal
work25 has tended to exist in isolation from much of this literature about women
lawyers (and other recent entrants to the profession): a kind of ‘two solitudes’ in
critical legal scholarship. One exception to this approach is the longitudinal study of
some Toronto law firms undertaken by sociologists John Hagan and Fiona Kay in the
early 1990s to examine the impact of gender in survey data about the experiences of
men and women lawyers in relation to: initial articling placements, progression to
partnership, work and family conflicts, billing practices, and satisfaction levels.26 They
concluded that the profession of law had become ‘‘a contested domain’’ by the end of
the 1980s, with increased opportunities at the entry-level for both male and female
lawyers but a shrinking proportion of partnership opportunities: a ‘‘glass ceiling’’
which ‘‘became an increasing reality for women but also for men’’:
The practice of law became much more highly centralized and concentrated

in large firms during the 1970s and 1980s. . . . [The growth rate of lawyers
accelerated in private firms, government and business, but it also] involved,
in relative terms, a shrinking pool of centralized and concentrated
partnerships in large firms, with increasing numbers of lawyers in
intermediate and lower positions. In short, this was a period of growth
with a ceiling on upward outcomes. . . . Although the actual numbers of
women and men

lawyers at partnership levels of these firms

increased in absolute terms during this period, their relative shares of
partnership positions declined, and this ceiling eﬀect was more
pronounced for women than for men. During this period, men and
women were developing careers in a legal profession whose parameters
were changing in ways that traditional conceptions of professional
autonomy would not predict.27
Hagan and Kay’s study oﬀers a careful analysis of competing explanations for
the diﬀering experiences of men and women who are lawyers. In particular, they
examined the explanation that gendered experiences among lawyers occur primarily
as a result of diﬀerent choices being made by men and women about their careers
in the legal profession. According to this explanation, women lawyers who experience
a relative lack of career progress have made ‘choices’ to invest less in their careers
than in their families, by contrast with male lawyers.28 Significantly, this explanation
for the diﬀerent experiences of men and women lawyers assigns responsibility for
choices to individual lawyers—if women lawyers wish to succeed, it is simply a
matter of them behaving more like men in the legal profession. According to this
theory, women lawyers bear individual responsibility for improving their career
options; there is no need for the profession itself to change. Thus, in relation to
Menkel-Meadow’s question in her comparative study, the ‘diﬀerent choices’ theory
suggests that the answer is that the profession will change (some) women, but that
the entry of women will not change the profession.29

Yet, according to the study conducted by Hagan and Kay, even when women
invested in their careers to the same extent as men, women lawyers were not rewarded
at levels comparable to male lawyers; thus, explanations for women lawyers’ relative
disadvantage in the profession based on ‘diﬀerent choices’ were rendered
unpersuasive.30 Instead, they argued that gender stratification theory, an
explanation focusing on the structural constraints of law practice and legal culture,
and the extent to which they impose constraints on women lawyers’ choices, was
more persuasive. Their focus on a more structural approach shifts attention ‘‘away
from employees in order to focus on employers who are the source of many of their
problems’’.31 Using this approach, Hagan and Kay recommended the adoption of
broadly-based initiatives, including systematic tracking of firms’ partnership
decisions; tax incentives and other governmental policies to create more workplace
flexibility; support from professional associations in designing ways to minimise
work/family conflicts; education and prevention programmes; and the development
of innovative model

policies by

law societies.32 As

is evident, these

recommendations do not focus primarily on the ‘choices’ of individual lawyers,
but rather on systemic change in the practices of law firms and other legal
institutions. Adopting this theory leads to a diﬀerent response to Menkel
Meadow’s question: pursuant to the theory of gender stratification, it will be necessary
for the profession to change as a result of the entry of women.33
Yet, although Hagan and Kay, like other scholars of the legal profession, have
suggested a need for change in the legal profession, it is less clear exactly how these
necessary changes will occur. Particularly if appropriate changes depend on the
intervention of firm managers, law societies, or other professional associations, it
will be necessary to convince them of the long term benefits of gender equality
initiatives, including employer self-interest in retaining women lawyers.34
Significantly, Hagan and Kay recommended education programmes for firms
and other legal employers about the nature and consequences of gender
inequality for the profession, a recommendation also included in the 1993

report35 of the CBA task force—and the catalyst for my seminars for Toronto law
firms in the late 1990s.

Educating the profession: Touchstones for Change
The CBA task force recognised that its report was being presented in a context of
significant change in the structure and organisation of legal work in Canada,
and elsewhere.36 Indeed, one of the most interesting features of the report is its
characterisation of the challenge of gender equality in the legal profession as an
integral part of the re-shaping of the profession. For example, in the introductory
comments of the task force chair, former Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme
Court of Canada, the problem was presented as a problem about identity for
members of the legal profession in relation to these new developments:
[The entry of women to the legal profession] ‘shook up’ the profession and
men as well as women were forced to confront issues to which they had
never given really serious thought before. . . . Lawyers realized that this was
a time for moral and intellectual stock-taking, for taking a cold dispassionate
look at where their profession was going. How was their profession faring
in the larger context of society? Was it a profession they were proud to
belong to? Or had it become a little tarnished over the years? Had it, as
some suggested, become ‘too commercialized’? Were people now in it for
the money? Were we still the moral and intellectual leaders in our
communities or were we just high-priced technicians at the beck and
call of the corporate elite? In sum, did the profession still warrant the
description ‘noble and learned’?37
Although phrased rhetorically, Justice Wilson’s questions clearly characterised
goals of gender equality as part of an overall professional commitment to justice;38
for her, lawyers have independent responsibilities to promote justice, not merely
their (corporate) clients’ interests. Although not everyone would agree with this

characterisation of the challenge, there can be no doubt or ambiguity about the
nature of the professional values adopted by the CBA report. For Justice Wilson
and the task force, ideas about justice were fundamental to concepts of lawyering.
In the face of often overwhelming and competing pressures on lawyers to meet
demands of global corporatism, such a stance may appear misguided, naive, even
hopeless. Yet, since it was these underlying principles in the task force report
which resulted in the gender equality seminars for Toronto law firms, the seminar
experiment provides an interesting opportunity to examine this educational initiative
in the context of legal practice demands. Equally significantly, it may be important
to assess the extent to which the task force report can be characterised as an
important ‘voice of resistance’ within the legal profession, and/or the extent to which
it oﬀers ideas and strategies critical to values and goals of legal education.
The Touchstones report systematically examined current policies and practices
aﬀecting women lawyers in private law firms and also in government, academe,
administrative tribunals and the judiciary,39 and made a long list of recommendations
(some quite controversial) which were subsequently considered in public discussions
by the National Council of the Canadian Bar Association.40 Touchstones suggested
that any transformation of the profession41 would require change at a number of
diﬀerent levels: ‘‘behaviours, attitudes, institutional policies and practices, and in
the structure of the profession itself ’’.42 Accordingly, the report concluded that the
process of change would require the profession to question the way that law is
practised as well as the profession’s assumptions underlying the status quo.43 And
significantly, the report identified ‘‘education about the nature of gender inequality
in the legal profession [as] crucial’’:
What is needed for the legal profession is ‘remedial human rights
jurisprudence’ accessible to non-specialists. . . . These messages should be
repeated until they form the basis of a common understanding of our legal
duties to our colleagues in the profession and beyond. . . . We must

develop a culture of ‘problem-solving’ for our own profession. Lawyers are
trained to criticize and demolish arguments. In order to achieve gender
equality, we must learn how to find creative solutions for our own
internal problems.44
The emphasis on education in the Touchstones report, as a strategy for
accomplishing institutional change in the legal profession in relation to gender
equality goals, is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the emphasis on
education suggests that current problems of gender inequality in the profession are
mainly the result of a lack of knowledge; as a result, Touchstones assumes that the
provision of knowledge through education will engender appropriate changes.
In this way, education about gender equality becomes a means to an end, a
process that is somehow separate from issues of power, economic resources, or
human will within the profession. Second, the emphasis on education appears
to assume that it is possible to provide information about the jurisprudence on
gender equality which will per se engender new and diﬀerent practices within the
profession, as if education about gender equality were no diﬀerent from
information about new legislative amendments which must be incorporated
into legal practice. This approach tends to underestimate the power of entrenched
ideas about gender roles in the profession, and in the larger society.45 As well, the
report’s emphasis on education to remedy gender inequality overlooks the extent
to which these challenges within the profession may require fundamental restructuring of institutions, as well as profound changes in individual attitudes and
behaviours. At the very least, achieving such goals requires highly specialised
education.
In spite of these potential limitations, however, several Toronto firms responded
to the Touchstones recommendations and took up the challenge of providing education
seminars about gender equality for several years after 1993.46 Although all of
the firms had well-established programmes for continuing legal education, they

approached the arrangements for oﬀering these seminars with special care. All of
the firms had conducted some internal surveys of their members’ experiences on a
variety of issues related to gender equality, so that the firms were able to identify
some issues of special concern to be addressed by the programme. All the same, the
creation of an appropriate seminar required a good deal of energy and creative
pedagogy in the context of highly sophisticated and articulate members of the
profession—many of whom had never (or hardly ever) analysed these issues before.47
In assessing the seminars, and the role of education generally as a strategy for
change, a number of constraints can be identified. For example, a one-time-only
seminar of two-and-a-half hours is unlikely to accomplish more than an introduction
to the issues and problems, especially in the context of education about gender
equality, where ideas may challenge longstanding attitudes, traditional and
wellestablished practices, and stereotypical views about gender roles. Indeed,
gender equality programmes which go beyond providing just information to
challenge fundamental values, attitudes and behaviour require time for reflection
and further discussion, a commodity all too rare in the environment of most large
law firms. As I conducted these (perhaps somewhat unique) educational
programmes for law firms over a number of years, the reality of workplace
demands for lawyers in these firms meant that gender equality education
frequently had to be ‘fitted into’ other, more important, pressures on them.
Moreover, it became clear that solutions to problems of gender inequality in
legal practice could be addressed only if they did not challenge the priority
accorded to work demands, or if they could be easily accommodated within the
prevailing law firm culture. Thus, to the extent that the literature suggests that
gender equality goals may require major changes to practices and cultures, they are
unlikely to be adopted readily in law firms. Such a conclusion limits the
usefulness of educational programmes to the provision of some basic
conceptions of gender inequality issues; they appear to be much less useful as
strategies for accomplishing substantive change in the legal profession.

Lawyers’ work and ‘asynchronicity’: (re)defining justice and gender
equality
As Margaret Thornton suggested in her analysis of lawyers’ work in Australia,
strategies for accomplishing change in the legal profession must confront the nature
of legal work and the culture within which legal work is done. Thornton’s study is
important for its sustained focus on the reality of legal work and the day-to-day
culture of the profession in the 1990s. She also identified how both the nature of
legal work and law firms’ expectations have been changing in recent decades, exactly
the same period in which women have begun to enter the legal profession in
significant numbers:
. . . [W]hile acceptance of women within legal practice is hailed as a sign of
progress, the dramatic changes that have occurred simultaneously in the
structuring of law firms have rendered the advances a pyrrhic victory. The
lawyer in the modern corporate law firm is subject to disciplinary practices
that are a far cry from the claimed independence and autonomy of the
past. The filling in of time sheets and the need to generate specific levels
of income signify the most notorious manifestations of control. . . . The
focus on income generation, eﬀected through the phenomenon of billable
hours, engenders a great deal of ambivalence among women, as employed
solicitors are expected to dedicate themselves totally to their careers and to
the firm. . . . Loyalty to the firm includes never complaining about its
practices to an outside body

48

Thornton identified these changes in terms of the increasing ‘corporatism’ of
law practice and the ‘commodification’ of lawyers, and revealed these developments
as controlling factors in shaping the nature of practice and the culture of the modern
legal profession. Similarly, Maureen Cain and Christine Harrington argued that
‘‘lawyers’ work shapes as well as reinforces the power relations in society’’ and legal
work most often ‘translates’ the needs of capital into legal rights.49 In such a context,

as Thornton argued, law firm ‘corporatism’ both undermines equality goals and
renders gender invisible.50
These insights about legal practice are important in the context of Ursula
Franklin’s analysis of ‘new’ technologies and their ‘asynchronicity’. She defined this
term as the opposite of ‘synchonicity’:
. . . [While] synchronicity evokes the presence of sequences and patterns,
fixed intervals or periodicities, coordination and synchronization,
asynchronicity indicates the decoupling of activities from their functional
time or space patterns. . . . The current widespread use of computer
networks . . .

has led to . . . the prevalence of asynchronicity, indicated

by the loosening, if not the abandonment, of previously compulsory time
and space patterns. This is a most significant change. No longer is one
pattern superseded by another pattern; the change now appears as a
move from an existing pattern to no discernable structure. I consider
the evolving destructuring by asynchronicity as an extremely important, if not the
crucial facet of the new electronic technologies.51
For Franklin, the role of asynchronicity in ‘‘unravelling social and political
patterns’’ is troubling. As she explained, the development of the ‘bitsphere’ (the
world of technological mechanisms) and its impact on the ‘biosphere’ (the organic
and human world) has created fundamental changes and challenges for the world as
we know it. For the purposes of this paper, moreover, Ursula Franklin’s concept of
asynchronicity ‘coincides’ in significant ways with Margaret Thornton’s ideas about
‘technocentrism’ in the work and legal education of lawyers. Indeed, Thornton’s list
of features of lawyers’ work is remarkably similar to the factors identified by Franklin
as elements of ‘asynchronicity’:
Ω legal rules assume neutral rationality, thereby disqualifying all other
knowledge;
Ω legal work requires acceptance of the normativity of existing practices; there

is no encouragement to challenge existing practices or to see things in new
ways;
Ω paid work is seen as the major focus of human activity and good lawyers are
those who work the longest hours;
Ω adoption of billable hours in large law firms is not so much related to the
product as it is to providing a means of control over the work and lives of
lawyers; and
Ω increasing specialisation of legal work means that almost no one sees a
transaction from beginning to end; as a result, there is a separation of work
being done from accountability/responsibility in terms of its goals or its overall
impact.
Thornton argued that the impact of technocentrism on legal work and legal
education was an ‘‘ideological desensitization’’.52 As Charles Derber argued, this
concept suggests that legal practitioners are ‘‘absolved from ethical responsibility’’
when they serve dubious interests: ‘‘technocentrism permits the normalization of
property and profit-making enterprises’’ and similar views in relation to sexism and
racism.53 Thus:
Law students need to undergo a process of ideological desensitisation in
preparation for practice. Hence, issues of ethics and justice are likely to be
given short shrift and to be treated as subordinate to mastery of technocratic
rules. Derber reports that studies involving first-year students in a wide
range of professions, including law, reveal a rapid shift from a predominantly
moral orientation to a technocratic one ... 54
In such a context, it appears at first glance that the CBA task force completely
failed to appreciate the importance of legal work and its culture in large law firms.
Although Touchstones acknowledged the existence of workplace demands, it did not
fully accept the priority presently accorded to work in law firm culture. Instead,

Touchstones argued that the primary focus in the profession should be the
requirements of justice, and that the achievement of gender equality goals was a
matter of justice.55 Challenging the idea that lawyers must respond fully to market
demands, Touchstones argued that the legal profession must take seriously its
public role, aspiring to meet the traditional ideal of lawyers as ‘‘noble and learned’’,
and refusing to succumb to the role of ‘‘high priced technicians’’, responding
only to the needs of the corporate elite. In this way, the report reveals the validity
of Hagan and Kay’s conclusion that the profession in the 1990s constituted ‘‘a
contested domain’’;56 Touchstones’ conception of the profession and its
responsibility for justice directly challenged dominant ideas of the legal
profession as market-driven and tending to corporatism and commodification,
technocentrism and asynchronicity.
Not surprisingly in this context, as I reflected on my experiences with the
gender equality seminars for major law firms, I initially concluded that the CBA
recommendations were simply wrong, or at least seriously misguided, even naive.
Although my criticisms may be too strong, I remain convinced that the CBA task
force failed to create an imaginative strategic plan for achieving change in the legal
profession in relation to its goals of gender equality. At the same time, however, it
is arguable that the CBA report represents a voice about justice within the Canadian
legal profession, a voice which presents both challenge and resistance to the dominant
discourse of technocentrism. As my experiences with these gender equality seminars
in Toronto law firms reveal, the challenge of achieving justice goals in a technocentric
legal universe remains daunting: the challenge of ‘fitting’ gender equality goals
( justice) into lawyers’ work demands without requiring any changes to existing
conditions of work—or any challenges to the prevailing culture of legal work in these
firms.
One concrete example illustrates the problem, and the merits of Franklin’s
diﬀerent approach, very well. In discussions about evening work, an issue that arose

frequently in these seminars, the problem was usually presented as a question about
the need for evening work; not surprisingly, most of the time, lawyers in these major
firms accepted that work during the evening was essential. In the context of our
discussions, however, it became clear that both male and female lawyers who were
the parents of small children in practice left the firm about 6 p.m. in order to spend
time with the children; and that by about 8 or 8:30 p.m., both male and female
lawyers returned to work. Significantly, however, male lawyers, much more
frequently than their female counterparts, physically returned to the law firms;
female lawyers were more likely to plug into a technological equivalent through
a home computer system. Both males and females with small children
frequently worked until midnight. However, it was only the male lawyers who
were ‘visible’ at work at the firm late at night. Indeed, compounding the gender
equality issue, female lawyers sometimes indicated that their resistance to
returning to the oﬃce was related to the lack of safety at night in underground
parking garages in downtown Toronto, the location of most of these large law
firms. As a result, it was often possible to have conversations about why male
lawyers, who had increased ‘face’ time in the firm, were thought to have worked
harder than female lawyers, particularly when all of these lawyers might well
have their work products completed by 8 a.m. on the following morning. Why,
we pondered, was it so important for people to be physically present in the late
evenings at these firms?
Such questions raise a number of interesting issues. Certainly, in the context of
the law firm seminars, it was possible to identify biases based on physical presence.
Indeed, I often tried to promote the idea that the issue should be whether the work is
done, and not the location in which the work is done. By contrast, Ursula Franklin’s
message is that it is important to think about the need for community in workplaces, and
the extent to which physical presence is an important part of a sense of community.
What is perhaps critical here, however, is the fact that in none of the seminars were we

able to address the question of why people have to work such long hours in legal firms!
Is all of this work really necessary? And if there is a community during the hours from 8
am to 6 pm, why is the community which is involved in ‘night work’ (substantially male
lawyers) so much more significant? To what extent does working the longest hours mean
that we are more (or less?) eﬃcient, more (or less?) capable, more (or less?) expert? If
someone can do the work and go home at 6 o’clock, without working in the evenings,
why does that make them ‘a less eﬀective, less accomplished lawyer’? These kinds of
questions reveal a paradox in the CBA recommendations and in my gender equality
seminars. On the one hand, we succeeded in revealing that current practices are not
unchangeable, while on the other hand we failed to take the work requirements, and
the culture of work requirements, seriously enough. We failed to ask fundamental
questions about what we are doing. And why.
Such an analysis suggests that strategies for accomplishing change in the legal
profession must take account of the fundamental imperatives of the work itself, and
especially the culture within which legal work is done. The CBA report assumed that
lawyers’ responsibility to achieve justice meant that they would embrace principles
of gender equality willingly once they understood them as important to
accomplishing the goals of a just society. Such an assumption does not suﬃciently
recognise the power of workplace demands in the law firm culture: even lawyers
who accept responsibility for ‘justice’ goals need to take seriously the competing
demands of work and legal culture in creating appropriate strategies.
Thus, while the CBA report supported a reconceptualising of the profession in
terms of its primary commitment to justice, it did not suﬃciently confront the most
fundamental barrier to change: the nature of legal work. As a result, the report failed
to respond to the power of work demands to sideline other goals, including those of
gender equality. In this context, educational programmes about gender equality
might represent another voice in the ‘contested domain’ about the nature of the
legal profession, but they do not constitute an eﬀective strategy for achieving

substantive change. Thus, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of change,
without minimising the power of existing barriers to curtail and constrain it, and to
understand that educational programmes about gender equality for the legal
profession are not a panacea.
And this is where Ursula Franklin’s lifelong work is so significant. Undoubtedly,
resistant voices of justice in the legal profession are the equivalent of Franklin’s
earthworm theory of social change: the voices which prepare the soil for change to
happen:
I have long subscribed to what I call Franklin’s earthworm theory of social
change. Social change will not come to us like an avalanche down the
mountain. Social change will come through seeds growing in well prepared
soil—and it is we, like the earthworms, who prepare the soil. We also seed
thoughts and knowledge and concern. We realize there are no guarantees
as to what will come up. Yet we do know that without the seeds and the
prepared soil nothing will grow at all. I am convinced that we are indeed
already in a period in which this movement from below is becoming more
and more articulate, but what is needed is a lot more earthworming ....... 57
In my view, it is altogether obvious that in the legal system, as in the social
world, change will not come from the mountain top but rather from earthworming:
the preparation of the soil by individuals who are prepared to challenge the
mainstream. In such a context, thoughtful law teachers might choose to emulate the
earthworms: Where, if not in school and workplace, is society built and changed?
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